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Case 2:23-cv-01298-JLS-BFM

I. INTRODUCTION

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In Plaintiff Todd R.G. Hill's "Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Order (Docket 248)" and "Supplemental Filing In Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Request for Judicial Notice" (Dkts. 253, 259) (collectively the "Motion"), Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court's March 27, 2025, "Order Accepting Magistrate Judge's Interim Report and Recommendations" (Dkt. 248) (the "Order"). The Motion is defective in that it fails to make any showing whatsoever as to why relief would be appropriate under Local Rule 7-18. Indeed, Plaintiff simply repeats arguments he already made in his objections to the Magistrate Judge's Interim Report and Recommendations ("Report"), and the only new evidence he purports to cite does not address any of the legal deficiencies that warranted dismissal of his claims. See Dkt. 213. Accordingly, this Court should deny the Motion in its entirety.¹

LEGAL STANDARD II.

Rule 7-18 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

A motion for reconsideration of an Order on any motion or application may be made only on the grounds of (a) a *material* difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been known to the party moving for reconsideration at the time the Order was entered, or (b) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the Order was entered, or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider *material* facts presented to the Court before the Order was entered. No motion for reconsideration may in any manner repeat any oral

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23, n.5.

¹ The State Bar Defendants are the State Bar of California, Leah Wilson, Natalie Leonard, Brandon N. Stallings, Melanie M. Shelby, Ruben Duran, Hailyn Chen, Audrey Ching, Arnold Sowell, Jr., Mark W. Toney, Paul A. Kramer, Jean Krasilnikoff, Ellin Davtyan, Louisa Ayrapetyan, George S. Cardona, Devan McFarland, and Enrique Zuniga. While the State Bar was not named as a defendant in Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, the Order adopted the recommendation in the Report to dismiss with prejudice the State Bar, along with the individual State Bar Defendants, presumably so that Plaintiff could not attempt to resurrect claims against the State Bar in a future complaint. See, e.g., Report at

or written argument made in support of, or in opposition to, the original motion.

Emphasis added.

For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff cannot establish that reconsideration is appropriate under Rule 7-18 and the Motion should therefore be denied.

III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. The Motion Should Be Denied Because Plaintiff Merely Repeats the Same Arguments the Court Previously Considered, and Rejected, in Issuing the Order.

L.R. 7-18 expressly forbids a request for reconsideration that merely "repeat[s] any oral or written argument." The Motion flouts this prohibition insofar as Plaintiff's request for reconsideration is based entirely on legal arguments that the Court considered, and rejected, prior to its adoption of the Report. Specifically, the Motion restates the same meritless grounds that are set forth his 28-page objections to the Report. See Dkt. 217. Ultimately, the Court elected to adopt the recommendations in the Report in their entirety, but not before reviewing the Objections and "engag[ing] in a de novo review of those portions of the [Report] to which objections [were] made." See Dkt. 248. Nonetheless, Plaintiff proceeds to rehash the very same arguments, all of which the Court rejected in issuing the Order, and none of which warrant reconsideration at this juncture.

Furthermore, in issuing the Order, the Court likewise considered the State Bar Defendants' Response to the Objections, wherein the State Bar Defendants fully addressed the contents of the Objections. *See* Dkt. 220, 5:7-7:3 (Plaintiff's claims against the State Bar Defendants are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the *Ex parte Young* exception does not vitiate sovereign immunity in these circumstances), 7:4-15 (a "detailed factual analysis of the State Bar Defendants' official versus individual capacities" is not warranted at the pleadings stage, where

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the only relevant inquiry is whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief), 7:15-20 (a plaintiff is not entitled to conduct discovery into the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity, nor is a plaintiff permitted to use discovery as a fishing expeditions to salvage his deficiently pleaded claims), 7:23-8:21 (a plaintiff is not entitled to judicial notice of nondescript batches of documents and communications but rather, facts, to the extent he demonstrates said facts meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 201), 8:22-10:5 (Plaintiff's assertion that the Court failed to apply the correct legal standard in evaluating Plaintiff's claims is without merit) and 10:21-11:18 (the Court properly denied Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint for a *fourth* time where the circumstances made clear that Plaintiff could not state any viable claim for relief against the State Bar Defendants).

Because the Court has already rejected Plaintiff's arguments in adopting the Report, there is no basis for reconsideration. In sum, the Motion violates L.R. 7-18 and should therefore be denied.

Plaintiff Presents No New *Material* Evidence in Support of His Request for Reconsideration of the Order. B.

Plaintiff touts the alleged discovery of "new evidence," i.e. an April 2, 2025, "Update on State Bar Roles," as one of the bases for granting the Motion. See Dkt. 259, 5:7-18. Even assuming arguendo that this alleged update constitutes "new evidence" (it does not), the Motion is devoid of any explanation as to how this alleged new evidence differs in any way, let alone in any material way, from the allegations in the SAC the Court previously considered in issuing the Order. Rather, the Motion speaks in generalities, asserting that the alleged new evidence displays a purported "pattern of institutional failure by the State Bar." See Dkt. 253, 8:14-16. This assertion is precisely the type of "conclusory allegation" that the Magistrate Judge rejected in her Report, which the Court adopted in its entirety in issuing the Order. See Dkts. 213, 248.

Nor does the Motion explain how the alleged new evidence addresses the Magistrate Judge's concerns regarding the legal deficiencies in the theories of liability Plaintiff has attempted to assert against the State Bar Defendants. In the Report, the Magistrate Judge identified numerous ways in which Plaintiff's allegations against the State Bar Defendants were barred as a matter of law. For example, the Magistrate Judge explained that the individual State Bar Defendants were not properly named in Plaintiff's claim for alleged violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. *See* Dkt. 213, 17:1-26. Yet, the Motion is entirely silent as to how the alleged new evidence overcomes the legal deficiencies in the SAC.

The same is true as to the Magistrate Judge's conclusions regarding the inadequacy of Plaintiff's race and gender discrimination claims. In recommending dismissal, the Magistrate Judge noted Plaintiff's failure to plead, both intentional discrimination on the part of the State Bar Defendants, as well as any alleged disparate impact upon members of the protected classes. *See* Dkt. 213, 2:6-17. Yet, there is no showing in the Motion as to how the alleged new evidence overcomes either of these hurdles. This is true as to each and every deficiency that the Magistrate Judge previously identified relative to Plaintiff's claims against the State Bar Defendants.

Because Plaintiff has offered no explanation as to how the alleged new evidence salvages his previously dismissed claims against the State Bar Defendants, the evidence is not "material." Reconsideration is therefore not warranted in these circumstances and the Motion should be dismissed.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has failed to establish that reconsideration of the Order is appropriate pursuant to Rule 7-18. Accordingly, the Motion should be denied in its entirety.

Dated: April 11, 2025

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

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Mark W. Toney, Paul A. Kramer, Jean
Krasilnikoff, Ellin Davtyan, Louisa
Ayrapetyan, George S. Cardona, Devan
McFarland, and Enrique Zuniga

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I, Ryan Sullivan, hereby declare: that I am over the age of eighteen years and am not a party to the within above-entitled action, that I am employed in the City and County of San Francisco, that my business address is The State Bar of California, 180 Howard Street, San Francisco, CA 94105.

On April 11, 2025, following ordinary business practice, I filed via the United States District Court, Central District of California electronic case filing system, the following:

STATE BAR DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COURT'S ORDER AND SUPPLEMENTAL FILING IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served.

See the CM/ECF service list.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at San Francisco, California, on April 11, 2025.

Ryan Sullivan